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 Abstract 
 
          This thesis makes a comprehensive assessment of the effect of a fiscal policy shock in 
Brazil. I found that gross domestic product does not rise in the short run in response to the 
fiscal policy shock albeit it rises in the long run. In addition, I found that unlike an advanced 
economy like the USA, the response of both fiscal and monetary variables estimated in the 
VAR are very volatile with the stock price index which represents Brazil’s financial sector in 
the VAR model responding negatively (revenue shock) to the policy innovation in the short 
run while rising and falling below the steady state several times throughout the forecasting 
horizon. Possible explanations for these results includes weak economic and political 
institutional frameworks leading to weak transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy 
innovations. In fact when government expenditure is not used for infrastructure projects, 
utility-generating economic activities or externalities that gets onto the economic 
production function, then extra government expenditure ends up taking resources away 
from the Brazilian economy.  
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 Introduction Motivation for Research 
 
          The global financial crises produced new and distinctive economic challenges for 
policymakers and demanded extraordinary policy responses. The early stages of the crises 
called for an exceptional monetary policy response to stabilise the global financial system 
but the credit channel was found to be uncharacteristically weak thus prompting 
governments to turn to fiscal policy to enhance aggregate demand and revive economic 
growth. During the said global economic crises, advanced economies were in recession but 
growth markets like Brazil continued to grow albeit not as fast as pre 2008 recession levels. 
In fact while output in advanced economies had fallen from an average of 1.8% to -5%, 
emerging economies were on average growing at a rate of 1% from a pre-recession high of 
7% (Abiad, et al., 2012) prompting analysts to make a case for an economic decoupling of 
emerging economies from advanced economies (ibid).  
          The transmission mechanism of a fiscal policy shock is well understood in advanced 
economies but not so much in emerging economies for two reasons. Firstly, a majority of 
the research on fiscal policy shocks have been on advanced economies (Caldara & Kamps, 
2008; Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; Cimadomo & Bénnasy-Quéré, 2012) and while availability of 
data may be the reason, it means that our understanding of the response of fiscal and 
monetary variables to fiscal policy innovations in emerging economies is limited. Secondly, 
the low incidence of domestic and external shocks as pertains to emerging economies 
(Abiad, et al., 2012) implies a paucity of qualitative evidence on the response of fiscal and 
monetary variables to a positive government spending and revenue shock. 
          To help address the knowledge gap, I studied the effect of a fiscal policy shock in Brazil 
which is a prototypical and prominent emerging economy. I chose to study Brazil firstly for 
data purposes and secondly because emerging economies – especially Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC) - are the main drivers of global economic growth (Khanna, et al., 2005) 
whose economic development are likely to eclipse most of the current rich countries in the 
World by 2050 (Goldman Sachs, 2001). In fact Jim O’Neil who is Chairman of Goldman Sachs 
Asset Management estimates that BRIC will add $13 trillion to their collective GDP by 2020 
while Brazil alone adds $1 trillion to her GDP in the same period ahead of advanced 
economies like Germany and the UK (University of Surrey School of Economics Alumni 
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Lecture, 2012) thereby raising crucial economic policy questions linked to the global 
economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in the BRIC (Goldman Sachs, 2001) especially 
in relation to the aggregate demand and subsequent economic growth effects of fiscal 
policy. Thus, I assessed the effect of fiscal policy shock on Brazil’s economy. Specifically, I 
assessed the impact via changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and via the behaviour of 
inflation, interest rate and the stock price index after the fiscal policy innovation. The fiscal 
multiplier which describes the change in GDP that is due to a change in spending or tax 
policy was also looked at.  
          I found that for a linear trend analysis, unlike advanced economies, extra government 
expenditure was not expansionary but tax cuts was expansionary. Revenues and interest 
rates rose after positive government expenditure shock for both a linear and quadratic 
trend analysis. And the later causing a short run fall in inflation after policy innovations for 
both a linear and quadratic trend analysis. For the financial sector of Brazil’s economy, the 
stock price index as specified in the VAR model rose sharply in response to a positive 
government expenditure shock but falls in response to a revenue shock for both linear and 
quadratic trend analysis. Overall, unlike the pattern seen for advanced economies, the fiscal 
and monetary variables are highly volatile in response to the policy innovations.  
          The conclusion is that the opaque nature of Brazil’s economic and political institutions 
implied that the transmission mechanism is weak offering an explanation for the high 
volatility of output, inflation, interest rate and stock price index. In terms of the observed 
negative output, I concluded that expansionary fiscal policy that is not used for 
infrastructure projects, utility-generating economic activity or positive externalities takes 
resources away from the Brazilian economy. Literature Review Theoretical Literature 
 
          Fiscal policy underscores the impact of government spending and taxation on 
aggregate demand against the backdrop of the microeconomic effects of resource allocation 
and distribution (Allsopp & Vines., 2005) including the provision of socioeconomic safety 
nets. At the crux of fiscal policy is economic welfare - as an increase in government spending 
increases or improves public goods and services (discounting the cost of financing a deficit if 
net tax receipts are less than government expenditure) while low taxes increases real 
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disposable incomes thus increasing the propensity to consume and inducing economic 
agents to decide between savings and investment or both. Indeed the art of making fiscal 
policy with its concomitant transmission mechanisms is crucial for governments as voters, 
public institutions such as the central bank, investors and policymakers need the policy 
awareness in order to determine whether the fiscal policy regime is effective enough to 
stimulate and sustain economic growth both in the short and long run without causing a 
fiscal crisis (Mauro, et al., 2013). 
                   The two competing school of thoughts are that high fiscal deficits threaten to 
crowd out private spending and significantly undermine market confidence as interest rates 
rise (neoclassical or real business cycle theory) while the Keynesian outlook makes a strong 
case for the inoperability of fiscal contraction during a loss in economic output (as the 
proverbial “green shoots” will not be aided) due to model assumptions that both prices and 
wages are flexible and aggregate supply curve is vertical as prices adjusts to meet aggregate 
demand at full employment in a closed economy. The role of fiscal policy as a 
macroeconomic tool is even more profound when the interest rate is at the lower zero 
bound e.g. the current US Federal Reserve policy rate (The Economist, 2012). At the zero 
bound policy rate (Rn,t ≥0), the central banker is unable to stabilise economic output and 
inflation through the manipulation of interest rate (Cecchetti, 2000) and expansionary fiscal 
policy therefore becomes an indispensable macroeconomic policy tool for the central 
government. In fact, recent DSGE studies have emphasised that at the lower zero bound 
constraint, economic growth is largely dependent on aggregate demand and thus all policies 
should be geared towards stimulating demand in the short run as spending cuts can actually 
increase budget deficits at the lower bound constraint (Denes, et al., 2013). This also makes 
a strong case for tax cuts which stimulate demand and - eventually economic growth - and 
also increase the economic welfare of the poor. In fact fiscal policy shock can be an increase 
in government expenditure or tax cuts (Jawadi, et al., 2011). Table 1: The Effects of a Positive Government Spending Shock using Theoretical Models 
Theoretical Framework       GDP        Interest Rate          Inflation          Stock Price Index 
Neoclassical RBC                       +                  +                               0                           +    
DSGE Nominal Frictions           +                 __                              +                          ---  
DSGE Deep Habits                     +                 ---                             ----                        + 
Source: Adapted from Fragetta & Melina, 2011 & Jawadi, et al., 2011. 
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Table 1 above summarises the expected qualitative results found in the theoretical 
literature for a positive government spending shock. Empirical Literature 
 
          The VAR literature on impact of fiscal policy shocks have generally shown that positive 
government spending shocks have a positive impact on gross domestic product and positive 
tax shocks reduces economic growth (IS Curve shifts to the left) while both tax hikes and 
spending increases reduces private investment in the economy (Caldara & Kamps., 2008; 
Blanchard & Perrotti., 2002). In fact, the said observation is irrespective of the type of 
identification approach used (Caldara & Kamps, 2008) and is consistent with both Keynesian 
and neoclassical theories. Theoretically, expansionary fiscal policy either in the shape of 
spending increase or tax cut pushes interest rate up and contractionary fiscal policy in the 
form of spending cuts or tax hikes forces interest rates down (Kirsanova, et al., 2005; Leith, 
et al., 2003) and this contrasts with the empirical evidence from Malik (2013) wherein a 
positive spending shock brought an increase in the policy rate albeit Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium modelling was used. Furthermore, Chatziantoniou, et al., (2013) in 
using the VAR framework elucidated that fiscal policy and interest rate were divergent 
mechanisms and the findings were consistent with those of Sargent & Wallace (1981) and 
Melitz, (1997) albeit when convergent, fiscal policy and interest rate regimes shared the 
spoils in controlling inflation and stabilising economic output. Recently, Dell’Erba and Sola 
(2013) of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department have shown that general movements towards 
fiscal consolidation and low monetary policy rates have led to low long term interest rates 
and low sovereign spreads while budgets deficits reverses the trend in advanced economies. 
          A number of the economic literature has also focused on the role of a ballooning 
government debt on stock prices. And here, the approach has been to look at what effect 
temporary changes in nominal interest rate might have on prices when the fiscal authorities 
do not aggressively attempt to stabilise the debt stock. In this instance, the effect of a fiscal 
policy shock on the stock market may be positive, negative or even negligible depending on 
whether one chooses a Keynsian, Classical and Ricardian (“tax now or tax later”) approach 
respectively 
          The response of the stock market to a fiscal policy shock is well documented in the 
economic literature. Indeed, the extensive literature also makes a distinction between 
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anticipated and unanticipated fiscal policy shocks and their respective transmission 
mechanisms. Darrat (1988) who used a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling 
specifically found significant lagged effects of anticipated fiscal policy actions but found 
significantly negative impact of fiscal deficits on stock price indices. This was consistent with 
the findings of Agnello & Sousa (2010) who used a panel vector autoregression approach 
and found an immediate but temporary negative response of stock prices to a fiscal policy 
shock. Moreover, Afonso and Sousa (2011) in employing a vector autoregression also found 
government expenditure shock elicits a negative response from stock prices but revenue 
shocks had a small albeit positive impact on stock price indices. While Jansen, et al. (2008) 
used a semiparametric analyses and argues that the effect of fiscal policy on stock price 
indices depends on the presence of other macroeconomic policy tools like interest rate. 
          Another school of thought has focused on the interactions between fiscal and 
monetary policies on the stock price index. This view takes into account the effect of the 
said policies on the output gap and inflation. Specifically, it is widely believed that on the 
fiscal side the interaction occurs through the effect of fiscal policy on monetary variables 
such as inflation, interest rate and exchange rate while on the monetary side, it occurs 
through the government inter-temporal budget constraint wherein the constraint requires 
that the fiscal authority finances expenditure via taxation, borrowing or seignorage 
(Chatziantoniou, et al 2013). Furthermore, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that a 
hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated 
with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. And with an independent central bank 
employing a tight monetary policy regime, it follows on that eventually inflation rises as 
deficit financing requires an increase in the growth rate of the money supply. That said, it is 
well known that asset prices are not supposed to stay constant in real terms during the 
business cycle. And where there is significant appreciation, it is generally thought that this 
increase in asset prices reflect real economic growth and a comparable growth in earnings 
or the expected return on assets in equilibrium. However, when adjusted for inflation, 
nominal and real economic growth, Fatas and Mihov (2013) in excluding factors such as 
interest rate, expected earnings growth and risk appetite for example elucidate that the 
record high levels of stock price indices recorded post 2009 financial crisis recovery is not 
extraordinary as they are comparably low to the prices seen in the 1990s financial bubble. 
On the bond markets however, deficit financed expansionary fiscal policy could signal 
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markets to weigh the probability that a government default could rob investors of the 
expected earnings on their loans as ceteris paribus a higher debt burden translates into 
higher risk of default and this risk is higher when the current account deficit is larger. The 
resultant downgrade of a government debt brings new information onto the stock market 
and may affect the way investors behave. From the literature review, it is possible to 
conclude that expansionary fiscal policy induces a negative reaction from the stock market. 
          The transmission mechanism of a fiscal policy shock via inflation is well documented in 
the academic literature. In essence, increases in nominal public debt in the absence of 
expected increases in taxes or the price level leaves economic agents with nominal 
disposable incomes until increases in the price level erode their wealth, inducing these 
agents to scale back their spending. The preceding behavioural mechanism implies that an 
interest rate hike flows directly through increased nominal government spending. And in the 
neoclassical model wherein prices are deemed to fully flexible, the central banker loses their 
authority to affect the price level as interest rate hikes means that government debt 
increases and this has the potential of reducing economic welfare as interest rate payment 
is a major part of government spending. However in a new Keynesian model with assumed 
price stickiness, the central banker maintains the ability to generate a recession or speed up 
economic growth albeit it loses trend inflation. Duarte and Wolman, (2008) in using a two 
region general equilibrium model with traded and non-traded goods (for a country in a 
monetary union) found that lowering income tax rate in response to inflation differentials 
translated into suppressed inflation differentials leading to a higher volatility in domestic 
inflation while leaving the volatility of real economic growth roughly unchanged. In addition, 
where this output volatility induces a “Nash game” style conflict over the size of the output 
gap, then the policymaker can expect interest and exchange rate volatility (Leitemo, 2004). 
It is well known in theoretical economics that persistent fiscal deficits are inflationary but 
showing this to be true empirically has not always been easy or straightforward except for 
Catao and Terrones (2005) wherein a very large dataset was used and inflation was 
modelled as non-linearly related to fiscal deficits through the inflation tax base and 
estimation was then carried out under the assumption of a dynamically intrinsic 
relationship.  
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 Data 
 
          I use quarterly data from the period 1997Q1 to 2008Q4 giving 𝜂 = 48 observations for 
baseline variables for Brazil i.e. government expenditure (government expenditure + Gross 
Investment) (EXPEND), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation (INF), government revenue 
(REV) and interest rate (INT) and for the stock price index (STOCKPIX). The components of 
national income and fiscal series including the stock price index are all in real terms at 
source. I restrict the estimation of national income and fiscal series to the period up to the 
last quarter of 2008 as afterwards the data series is likely to have been affected by the 2009 
global financial crises and the resultant market mayhem could lead to higher multipliers due 
to large output gaps. The real stock price index (Stockpix) data was in monthly series and 
this was aggregated using arithmetic mean. Data on gross government expenditure and 
gross investment were added up and divided by 2 for each series pair to obtain total gross 
government expenditure (government expenditure + government investment).  
          I decided to use the GDP deflator which is an economic metric which gives a 
satisfactory record and explanation of inflation (price rising to keep up with the increased 
cost of production which leads to a fall in the purchasing power of money) by converting 
output measured at current prices to constant dollar GDP. The GDP deflator is preferred to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI, based on a representative fixed basket of goods) in this 
study as it shows how much a change in the base year’s GDP relies upon changes in the 
price level. It also captures changes in consumption patterns or the addition of new goods 
and services to the macroeconomy. And the importance of this choice is underscored by the 
fact that Brazil is an emerging market and likely to have a relatively higher number of new 
services and products being introduced into the economy. 
          In addition, I transformed the components of the fiscal series and national income into 
their natural logarithm form with the aim of stabilising the variance of the fiscal series (see 
Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004) and reducing heteroscedasticity. The gdp deflator (inflation) and 
interest rate series were not transformed into their logarithmic format. Furthermore, gross 
domestic product is in constant prices and percent change, government expenditure, 
government investment and tax revenue is in percent of GDP while gross domestic product 
deflator (inflation) is in index form. I sourced the data on gross domestic product, 
government expenditure and investment, tax revenue, and gross domestic product deflator 
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(Inflation) from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database April 
2013 and the data on real interest rate is sourced from The World Bank Open Data website. 
I sourced the data on real stock price index from Yahoo Finance. I use Eviews 6 Student 
version to estimate the Recursive Approach. 
 Econometric Methodology 
 
          It is well known that time series data exhibit a variety of behaviour. Thus, there are 
several steps to be addressed before estimation of the VARs and it is noteworthy that the 
steps I describe here are not exhaustive. The first of these is the determination of the 
stationarity or non-stationarity of variables via unit root tests and tests for first difference if 
variables are found to be non-stationary (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests).  The second is the 
test of cointegration for non-stationary variables that have to be first differenced to reach 
stationarity i.e. integrated of order 1 I (1).  Then there are other equally important 
considerations too and these include the optimal number of lags to be employed and the 
de-trending methods to be used which to a large extent could account for the different 
qualitative and quantitative results found in the VAR literature on effect of fiscal policy 
shocks (Caldara & Kamps, 2008) 
          Economic theory informs the selection of variables while multivariate information 
criteria informs the selection of optimal lag. An extensive review of the VAR literature 
elucidates three multivariate information criteria namely the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC). From the data used for this 
study, I provide the values for AIC, SC and HQC in the table below adapted from the Eviews 
output. Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag               Akaike Information Criterion    Schwarz criterion   Hannan-Quinn criterion 
     1                -29.31                                            -27.59                       -28.67 
     2                -28.24                                            -25.05                       -27.06 
     3                -28.16                                            -23.49                       -26.43 
     4                -38.33                                            -32.18                       -36.06 
     5                -42.46*                                         -34.84*                     -39.65* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion in Eviews 6 Student Version 
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As can be seen from the table above the optimal lag for my dataset is 5 but since a review 
the VAR literature (Burriel, et al., 2010; Caldara & Kamps, 2002; Blanchard & Perotti, 2002) 
shows a strong preference for 4 lags and the relatively small number of observations (48) I 
choose the latter with the added benefit of avoiding over-fitting as adding more lags 
improves the fit but reduces the degrees of freedoms and increases the danger of over-
fitting. And this is how the AIC and SC works as they are the measures of the trade-off 
between fit and loss of degrees of freedom so that the chosen lag length should minimise 
both AIC and SC.  
          All five baseline variables namely EXPEND GDP INF REV INT were found to be non –
stationary except STOCKPIX and had to be first differenced to achieve stationarity. I then 
tested all five baseline variables plus STOCKPIX for cointegration (spurious regression) and 
rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration and the Eviews values can be found in the 
tables below. I then proceed to prefer the Vector Error Correction Model and thus choose a 
rank (number of cointegrating equations) of 1(one) in Eviews when prompted as this is in 
reference to the first difference terms in the Vector Error Correction. 
 Table 3: Unit Root and First Difference Tests of Stationarity 
                                          ADF Level & Intercept                            ADF ∆ First Difference 
                  t-Statistic     Probability    Critical Values        t-Statistic   Probability Critical Values 
EXPEND    -1.35            5% level        -2.93                         -6.71          5% level      -1.95 
GDP          -2.20             5% level        -2.93                         -6.71          5% level     -1.95 
INF            -0.34             5% level        -2.93                         -6.71          5% level     -1.95 
REV           -1.82             5% level        -2.93                         -6.71          5% level     -1.95 
INT            -0.98             5% level        -2.93                         -6.71          5% level     -1.95 
STOCKPIX -4.58             5% level        -2.93 
 
 Table 4: Tests for Cointegration 
Variable                    t-Statistic           5% Critical Value(Eviews)        Probability 
E(-1)                          -2.88                    1.68                                            0.00 
∆E(-1)                        1.73                     1.68                                            0.23 
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 Figure 1: Stationarity of Variables of Interest 
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Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the behaviour of both fiscal and monetary series. 
Indeed, inflation is “trending” and expenditure, gross domestic product, interest rate and 
revenue (below) are “wandering about a trend”. In addition, the series for the real stock 
price index are fluctuating around a constant. The behaviour of the variables of interest is 
consistent with the outcome of the tests for stationarity and non-stationarity as non-
stationary series display wandering behaviour around a trend and or constant while 
stationary series display fluctuating behaviour around a trend and or constant (Lütkepohl & 
Krätzig, 2004) as can be seen from the stockpix series which was found to be stationary.  Recursive Approach 
 
          A detailed review of recent academic literature on assessing fiscal policy shocks 
delineates Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) as the main econometric tools that have 
been used (Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; Cimadomo & Bénassy-Quéré., 2012; Caldara & 
Kamps., 2008; Jawadi, et al., 2011; Burriel, et al., 2010). In a simplified form, VAR is a 
statistical model that is used to capture linear interdependencies among multiple time 
series. The VAR literature delineates four different identification approaches. Specifically, 
these are the recursive approach, Blanchard Perotti approach (Blanchard & Perotti, 2002), 
event study approach (Ramey & Shapiro, 1998) and sign restrictions approach (Mountford & 
Uhlig, 2005). I will focus on the recursive approach. Its imperative to note that a detailed 
review of the VAR literature on fiscal policy shocks have shown that due to the employment 
of different identification approaches, variables of interest,  detrending methods (first 
difference, linear, quadratic and Hodrick-Prescott Filter), sample periods and number of 
lags, the empirical results have been somewhat different and sometimes difficult to 
compare. Thus I briefly describe the qualitative effects of positive government spending 
shock in the table below. 
 Table 5: The Qualitative Effects of a Positive Government Shock using Empirical Models 
Empirical Models        GDP              Interest Rate             Inflation         Stock Price Index 
Recursive                           +                      +                                  ---                           -- 
Blanchard-Perotti            +                      --                                   +                            --                                   
Event Study                       +                     --                                   --                            -- 
Sign Restrictions               +                     ---                                  +                           -- 
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Source: Adapted from Fragetta & Melina, 2011 & Jawadi, et al., 2011.  
 
         The macroeconomic impact of fiscal and monetary policy shock will be assessed using the 
Bayesian Structural Vector Auto-regression (BSVAR) and an estimate will be calculated in the 
following manner 
Г(L) Xt = Г0 Xt = Г1 + Xt-1 + …= c + ԑt                (1) 
                   Vt = Г0-1 ԑt,                                      (2) 
Г(L) is an nxn matrix and Xt is an nx1 matrix 
Where ԑt | Xs , S < t ~ N(0,Ʌ), Г(L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag 
operator L, n is the number of variables in the system and ԑt are the fundamental economic 
shocks that span the space of innovations to Xt and Vt is the VAR innovation. 
     Fiscal policy can then be characterised as  
                   git = f (Ωt) + ԑti                          (3) 
where git is the fiscal policy instrument, f is a linear function, (Ωt) is the information set 
available to the government at the time of setting the policy and ԑti is the shock. 
A recursive identification scheme is then considered and consistent with Jawadi, et al., 2011, 
an assumption is made of the variables in Xt. Specifically, (i) a subset of n1 variables, X1t, 
which do not respond contemporaneously to the fiscal policy shock; (ii) a subset of n2 
variables, X2t, that respond contemporaneously to it; and (iii) the policy instrument in the 
form of the government spending, gt, or government revenue, tt. Thus, for the set of 
variables belonging to X1t, GDP, interest rate and inflation are added (Christiano, et al., 
2005) and the stock price index to X2t set of variables.  
          The principle behind a recursive identification is that the error terms in each 
regression is formed under the assumption that they are uncorrelated to the error terms of 
the preceding equation. And this can be achieved by the inclusion of some 
contemporaneous values as regressors. Thus, for my four variables of interest i.e. output, 
inflation, interest rate and stock price index, the first equation consists of output as the 
dependent variable followed by lagged values of all four variables as regressors. The second 
equation then consists of inflation as the dependent variable followed by lagged values of all 
four variables plus the current value of output. The third equation then consists of interest 
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rate as the dependent variable followed by lagged values of all four variables plus the 
current value of output and inflation and the fourth equation will be composed of the stock 
price index as the dependent variable followed by lagged values of all four variables plus the 
current values of output, inflation and interest rate. 
       Contemporaneous assumptions are made due to the fact that there are “k” possible 
ordering of the variables of interest in total and changing the order affects the results 
gained. Thus, the order is government expenditure, output, inflation, tax revenue and 
interest rate respectively with expenditure and revenue serving as the economic policy 
instruments. Ordering is primarily due to theoretical contemporaneous assumptions that 
movements in government expenditure, unlike movements in net tax receipts are largely 
unrelated to the real business cycle. This means that output and inflation are ordered 
before taxes as the aforesaid affect taxes. Interest rate is then ordered last and ordering 
interest rate last can be justified on the grounds of a central banker’s Stackelberg reaction 
function – where the central government is the Stackelberg leader – (see Kirsanova, et al., 
2005) thus implying that interest rate is set as a function of output gap and inflation with 
revenue and expenditure devoid of interest payments. In fact, the ordering helps capture 
the effects of the automatic stabilisers which are economic policies and programs that are 
designed to offset fluctuations in the macro-economy albeit without intervention from 
central government or policy makers. And automatic stabilisers come in the form of 
personal and corporate taxes, unemployment insurance/benefits and welfare. 
          Based on the contemporaneous assumptions, I order EXPEND (Government 
expenditure + Gross Investment) → GDP (Gross Domestic Product)  → INF (Inflation) → REV 
(Government Revenue) → INT (Real Interest Rate) → STOCKPIX (Stock Price Index). And this 
means that equation 2 above takes the following matrix form: 
           
[
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 0 0
𝑔𝑑𝑝/𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 1 0 0 0
𝑖𝑛𝑓/𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑓/𝑔𝑑𝑝 1 0 0
𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑖𝑛𝑓 1 0
𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑟𝑒𝑣 1]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑖𝑛𝑓
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝑖𝑛𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
ԑt = 
[
 
 
 
 1 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑖𝑛𝑓
𝑟𝑒𝑣
𝑖𝑛𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 vt 
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 Empirical Results 
 
          In this section, I interpret the findings of the recursive approach. I preferred the Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) to the unrestricted vector autoregression model (VAR) as all 
but one variable became stationary after first differencing and all were subsequently found 
to be co-integrated of order I(1). I also describe the estimates of the elasticities prevalent in 
the structural VAR identification scheme for Brazil below as this will help explain the effects 
of a government spending and revenue shock. Table 6: Elasticities of Government Spending and Revenue Shock 
                                   Elasticities of Government Spending               Elasticities of Government Revenue 
                                   𝜉G,Y         𝜉G,𝜋         𝜉G,i                                      𝜉T,Y             𝜉T, 𝜋         𝜉T,i  
Brazil                         0                -0.5           0                                           1.85             1.25          0 
Sourced from Blanchard & Perotti, 2002 and also cited in Jawadi, et al 2011. 
 Effects of a Positive Government Spending Shock Recursive Approach Linear Trend VECM 
 
          For the VECM, I tested for both a linear trend and a quadratic trend for Brazil’s 
economy. For a linear trend; In response to a 1% positive shock in expenditure, output 
(GDP) fall below the steady state and rises to the reach the steady state in the 4th quarter 
overshooting the steady state in the 4th quarter and returning to the steady state in the 5th 
quarter. Meanwhile, inflation falls after a government expenditure shock and fluctuates 
below the steady state while revenue increases as the government needs to recoup some of 
the money spent on the economy. However, interest rates rise above the steady state as a 
rise in expenditure crowds out investment spending and shifting the IS curve to the left in 
the process. The stock price index which represents Brazil’s financial sector in the SVAR 
model used fluctuate sharply above the steady state in response to a 1% government 
spending shock. Essentially the BOVESPA (stock price index) rises as the money supply 
increases as result of a rise in government expenditure and the shock persists throughout 
the 20 quarter horizon used in this study. However the rise is not sustained over the horizon 
and appears to fall toward to steady state. 
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 Quadratic Trend VECM 
 
          I then turn my attention to the impulse response functions for a quadratic trend 
VECM. As can be seen from the IRFs from figure 3, output falls in response to a 1% rise in 
government expenditure and returns and overshoots the steady state. That said, unlike the 
behaviour seen for the linear trend VECM analyses, output remains and fluctuates above 
the steady after overshooting it while inflation remains below the steady state until 18th 
quarter when it begins to rise but interest rate reacts quickly to the expenditure shock but 
falls and remains below the steady state after 4 quarters in line with the behaviour of 
inflation. Furthermore, in response to a 1% government expenditure shock, Brazil’s 
BOVESPA rises and fluctuate above the steady state as the market rises to an increase in the 
money supply. Effects of a Positive Revenue Shock Linear Trend VECM 
 
          From Figure 2, it can be seen that output (GDP) rises and remains above the steady 
state for the 20 quarter horizon in response to a 1% cut in taxes as spending patterns 
increase due to a rise in the marginal propensity to consume. But Brazilian consumers 
expect taxes to rise in the future or the tax cut to be followed by a spending cut from 
Brasilia so there is no permanent demand shock and thus as is evident from the IRFs in 
figure 2, inflation falls and remains below the steady state throughout the time horizon for 
this study. In the same vein, interest rate rise in the short run but this could be due to fact 
that the central bank uses the Taylor Principle to raise the real interest rate keeping inflation 
low in the process and helping postpone aggregate consumption. However the BOVESPA 
reacts negatively to a 1% tax cut as it falls below the steady state but rise above the steady 
state in the 2nd quarter and indeed the fluctuating pattern around the steady state 
continues throughout the forecasting horizon. This could be due to weak transmission 
mechanisms in the economy which I will elaborate on in the discussion section of this paper. Quadratic Trend VECM 
 
          The IRFs for the quadratic trend are similar to those of the linear trend VECM for a 
positive revenue shock. For instance in response to a 1% tax cut, output rises as the 
marginal propensity to consume increase from the disposal income and indeed Brazilians 
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may expect future tax hikes or spending cuts and thus induce them to save instead of spend 
their disposal incomes on goods and services and thus the tax cut does not cause a 
permanent demand shock and inflation falls below the steady state  and this fall in inflation 
could have been necessitated the fact the central bank uses the Taylor Principle to increase 
short term interest rate causing a reduction in the money supply and subsequent 
postponement of aggregate consumption. And as seen the in previous section, the BOVESPA 
reacts negatively to a revenue shock even though economic theory suggests that tax cuts 
information causes stock price indices to rise as investors expect to pay less tax on capital 
gains and dividends. Figure 2: IRFs of Linear Trend VECM for Recursive Approach 
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 Figure 3: IRFs of Quadratic Trend VECM for Recursive Approach 
 Table 7: Impulse Response to Positive Government Expenditure Shock 
Linear Trend                   Impact Effect  1 Year    2 Years   3  Years   4 Years   5 Years      Peak 
Expenditure                    0.01                   0.01       0.02        0.02        0.02         0.02       0.02(18)     
GDP                                 -0.06                  0.00      -0.02       -0.06       -0.03        -0.06        0.01(6) 
Inflation                         -0.01                 -0.02      -0.03       -0.03        -0.02        -0.03    -0.01(18)                               
Revenue                         0.004                 0.003    0.001      0.003       0.004      0.003   0.004(14) 
Interest Rate                  0.008                0.000   -0.001      0.003       0.003       0.005    0.008(1) 
Stock Price Index           0.09                  0.04        0.02       0.03         0.02         0.02       0.07(6) 
Values in () indicates peak quarter. 
 
Quadratic Trend           Impact Year     1 Year  2 Years  3 Years   4 Years  5 Years        Peak 
Expenditure                  0.012                 0.001     0.002     0.006      0.005     0.005      0.012(1) 
GDP                                -0.07                  0.06       0.03        0.00        0.01       0.00         0.03(8) 
Inflation                         0.000               -0.001    -0.002    -0.002    -0.001     -0.001     0.000(18) 
Revenue                        0.003                 0.000    -0.001      0.001    0.000       0.000     0.000(1) 
Interest Rate                 0.008                -0.002   -0.005     -0.004   -0.003     -0.002     0.008(1) 
Stock Price Index          0.10                    0.05       0.06        0.06       0.05        0.06       0.11(7) 
Values in () indicates peak quarter 
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 Table 8: Impulse Response to Positive Revenue Shock 
Linear Trend                    Impact Year   1 Year  2 Years   3 Years  4 Years   5 Years     Peak 
Expenditure                        0.00                    0.00       -0.01        -0.01       -0.01        -0.01           0.00(1) 
GDP                                      0.00                    0.00       0.04          0.04         0.07         0.05           0.07(16) 
Inflation                              0.000                  0.000    0.000        -0.001     -0.001      -0.001        0.000(4) 
Revenue                             0.001                  0.001     -0.002      -0.001     -0.001      -0.001        0.001(4) 
Interest Rate                     0.005                  0.003     -0.001       -0.003    -0.004      -0.003        0.005(1) 
Stock Price Index              -0.04                   0.02        -0.01           0.01       0.00         -0.01         0.02(2) 
Values in () indicate peak quarter 
 
Quadratic Trend             Impact Year        1 Year    2 Years     3 Years    4 Years     5 Years       Peak 
Expenditure                    0.000                    0.000     -0.003       -0.002      -0.001      0.000         0.000(1) 
GDP                                  0.00                       0.01        0.04           0.02          0.05        0.03           0.06(14) 
Inflation                           0.000                    0.000     -0.001       -0.001      -0.001      -0.001       0.000(4) 
Revenue                          0.001                    0.001      -0.001        0.000      -0.001       0.000        0.001(1) 
Interest Rate                  0.005                    0.003      -0.002       -0.003      -0.003      -0.002       0.005(1)                  
Stock Price Index           -0.04                     0.02         -0.02          0.00        -0.01         -0.01         0.02(2) 
 Values in () indicate peak quarter  De-trending Methods 
 
          De-trending methods essentially help pre-process time series for analyses that assume 
stationarity of variables. In the light of this, I found serial autocorrelation amongst all six 
variables i.e. expenditure, gross domestic product, inflation, revenue, interest rate and stock 
price index.  I used the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test and the null hypothesis is 
that there is no serial autocorrelation up to 𝜌 lags. In fact for the 4 lags chosen for this study 
the 𝜌 value is 0.00 which is significant. Furthermore, I tested all six variables for non-
normality using Lutkepohl’s Cholesky of covariance as the orthogonalization method and the 
null hypothesis of normal distribution (residuals are multivariate normal) based on the 
skewness and kurtosis of the standardised residuals is accepted.  
          The portmanteau test for residual correlation is usually employed to test the null 
hypothesis of no remaining residual autocorrelation at 𝜌 lags but this is essentially used for 
larger order VARs (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004) so I refrain from testing this on my six 
variables of interest.  
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 How are Results Different from those of a Prototypical Advanced Economy like USA 
 
          There are several observable differences in the behaviour of the fiscal and monetary 
variables in this study after the policy innovations especially when I consider the outcomes 
of studies using the VAR framework based on an advanced and open economy like the USA. 
Since the ordering of variables is important and in fact affects the results in a VAR, I restrict 
my comparisons to studies that have used the same variables and subsequently the same 
ordering to study the impact of fiscal policy shock on an advanced economy. That said, I 
could not find any study that had a similar sample period of 𝜂 =48 observations.  
          In an empirical assessment of fiscal policy shocks in the Euro Area and USA, Burriel, et 
al., 2010 found that output multipliers for a 1% rise in US government expenditure was 
about 0.76 on impact and increased gradually and only decreased after 12 quarters but 
remained positive over the 20 quarter horizon. According to the study, the price level and 
inflation in US responds slightly negative to an expenditure shock on impact but rises and 
remains above the steady state after 5 quarters. In fact consistent with economic theory, 
the fall in inflation is precipitated by upward movements in interest rates by the central 
bank (aimed at reducing the money supply). What is clearly evident here is that apart from 
the consistent positive output multipliers, the observed behaviour of fiscal and monetary 
variables are highly stable after the government expenditure and revenue shocks. This is in 
contrast with the observed behaviour of gross domestic product, inflation, interest rate and 
the stock price index after the policy innovations in this study. Moreover for both a 
quadratic and linear trend, the response pattern is highly volatile with the stock price index 
which represents Brazil’s financial sector in this model rising above and falling below the 
steady state several times in response to a positive revenue shock. 
          It is noteworthy that other assessments of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on fiscal 
and monetary variables (Blanchard & Leigh, 2013; Eyraud & Weber, 2013; Warner, 2013; 
Mountford & Uhlig, 2005; Caldara & Kamps, 2002; Blanchard & Perotti, 2002) have 
produced similar results to that of Burrriel, et al., 2010. And this is not unexpected as 
majority of these studies were based on advanced economies and in theory the findings 
should be extrapolated to emerging economies. However, there are several factors peculiar 
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to emerging economies that can explain the observed differences in the behaviour of fiscal 
and monetary variables after fiscal policy innovations. 
          The first of these factors is the inefficiency debate. The rationale for government 
spending to stimulate economic activity has its roots in Keynesian economics (Keynes, 
2008). In fact economists that adhere to the belief even go on to disregard budget deficits if 
extra government spending can spur growth in the short run. That said, the literature on 
optimal fiscal policy strategy points to the fact that Keynesian economics assume that the 
central government has all the information about which goods and services are not in 
efficient use (ibid). However, the central government as a matter of fact does not always 
have all the information about where resources are needed most and indeed if the spending 
is not on infrastructure projects, utility-generating economic activity or positive externalities 
then it is unlikely to get onto the production function (Warner, 2013). Where this is the case 
then government spending will generate negative economic growth - seen in the results - as 
resources are taken away from the economy. 
          A second and more specific reason to Brazil and other emerging economies is the 
institutional debate. The economic and political institutions in emerging economies are 
generally believed to be weak. And Mishkin (2004) outlines these as weak fiscal institutions, 
low credibility of monetary institutions, currency substitution and liability dollarization, 
vulnerability of sudden stops of capital inflows and weak financial institutions including 
government prudential regulation and supervision. In fact for Brazil, it is well known that the 
banking sector is weak and not well developed with the last two decades seeing major 
transformations in the sector during which there was hyperinflation solved by the 
introduction of the Real in 1994. Furthermore, only 15% of Brazilian banks have a 
sustainability policy (Amigos Da Terra, 2012) - which includes but not limited to boosting 
and harmonizing prudential regulations in line with international best practices, 
development and enhancement of financial sector supervision and the establishment of 
deposit insurance and crisis resolution protocols (Ogawa, et al., 2013) - and this has serious 
implications for the transmission of fiscal policy innovations. Financial frictions present in 
Brazil’s banking sector magnifies the volatility seen in the response of the stock price index 
to the fiscal policy innovation. And this volatility could be also due to the fact that Brazil’s 
economy is less diversified and in fact dependent on commodities. 
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          It is generally accepted in macroeconomics that uncertainty about future fiscal policy 
actions from the central government can cause current fiscal policy innovations to produce 
awkward results. And this is more relevant in an emerging economy like Brazil where 
government purchases can be highly volatile. In fact the outcome of policy innovations is 
highly unpredictable in countries where institutions that provide information on policy 
actions are opaque (Brandao-Marques, et al., 2013) and this opacity could spur corrupt 
practices. When fiscal institutions are less transparent, investors, public institutions, the 
central bank and the private sector do not have the same information horizon and thus are 
in the dark about current policy initiatives and cannot carry out strategic policy response or 
investment actions. This imply that there is no optimal response from the central bank and 
the public lack a well-informed inflation expectation thereby leading to the volatility 
observed in the fiscal and monetary variables in response to a positive government and 
revenue shock. Opaque economic and political institutions lacks inclusivity (David & Petri, 
2013) and produces inefficient financial markets (Malkiel, 2003) and the observed response 
of BOVESPA (Brazil’s stock price index) which represents the financial sector in the VAR 
model employed is testament to this assertion. In fact efficient markets driven by a quality 
and accurate information horizon reduces the incidence of disproportionate reaction of 
investors to new information and enable prices to reflect all the available information in an 
efficient manner (ibid), increasing price stability in the process. I hereby present an 
economic explanation of how the multiplier effect of government expenditure may differ 
under inclusive and exclusive economic and political institutions. 
          Let us assume the Brazilian and USA economy is both made up of two representative 
economic agents i.e. the central government and the consumer both existing and operating 
under opaque and transparent institutional frameworks respectively. We also assume the 
government adheres to Keynesian economics and thus in USA decides to spend £200 on 
providing infrastructure for the consumer. We assume that both agents have a linear 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of 0.65 (65%) implying that they spend/invest 0.65 * 
200 = $130 and save £70 and thus the government collects £130 in taxes. The government 
then spends 0.65 * 130 = $84.5 on externalities for the consumer this time round and 
collects 0.65 * 84.5 = $54.9 in taxes. 
 
In this model GDP or total output = 200 + 0.65*200 +0.652 * 200 + 0.653 * 200 +… 
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We can then rewrite this as 200 (1 + 0.65 + 0.652 + 0.653 +…0.65n)  
Where n is the number of cycles between the central government and the consumers. The 
multiplier = 11−0.65 = 
1
0.35 =2.86 * 200 = $572 meaning that an extra dollar given an MPC of 
0.65 will yield £572 to the economy. So in this model, the linear MPC drives the multiplier 
and this is stable throughout the cycle because the consumer has credible information 
about the spending patterns of the central government and due to the inclusive and 
transparent nature of the economic and political institutions, all the $200 is actually spent 
on infrastructure projects that benefit the consumer. 
          However, the central government and the consumer in Brazil do not enjoy the same 
transparent and inclusive economic and political institutions in USA and thus are not 
compelled to spend all the $200 earmarked for infrastructure and utility-generating 
economic activity on the said projects. This means the dollar effect of the multiplier is 
reduced in nominal terms providing an explanation for the negative output observed after 
fiscal policy innovations by Brasilia. 
 Discussion 
 
          This thesis presents a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the effect of fiscal 
policy shock in a prototypical emerging economy like Brazil. I found that unlike the general 
results seen for advanced economies, a unit rise in government purchases and a unit fall in 
tax revenue did not lead to economic growth in the short run. Although economic growth 
occurs at some point in the long run, the economic and political motivations for such policy 
innovations – based on Keynesian economics – are such that extra expenditure occurs only 
because the policymaker believes that it will spur economic growth in the very short run 
while pushing interest rates up and lowering inflation; outcomes desired by the voting 
public and the policymaker. That said, while the response of fiscal series to an expenditure 
shock (for both a linear and quadratic VECM) does not fit expectations as per economic 
theory, it can be seen that the baseline monetary variables behave as expected i.e. rise in 
interest rates causes a downward pressure on inflation as the money supply reduces. I also 
explained that the difference seen in the fiscal and monetary variables in response to the 
fiscal policy innovations could primarily be due to weak transmission mechanisms that arise 
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as a result of opaque and exclusive economic and political institutions in Brazil and the mass 
protests in Brazil in June 2013 is testament to this.  
          There are a number of factors that could have affected the results of this thesis. 
Firstly, the number of data observations 𝜂 =48 is very small. This is because GDP data on 
Brazil from the IMF website starts from the mid-1990s and there appeared to be a limit of 5 
lags when I was selecting the optimal lag for the SVAR/VECM in Eviews 6 student version. It 
is well known that results in a VAR framework are affected by the number of lags chosen 
although the literature seems to point to 4 lags as the optimal. Furthermore, for most 
central governments, fiscal policy decisions are made yearly with the possibility of making 
minor adjustments throughout the year. And for the voting public and consumers, the 
announcement of an intended policy action induces these rational agents to adjust their 
consumption patterns accordingly before the onset of the policy. Thus the estimates of the 
impact of a fiscal policy shock presented in this thesis based on quarterly data could be 
biased (Burriel, et al., 2010). To address this, researchers such as Blanchard and Perotti, 
2002 included an indicator of forthcoming fiscal policy actions in their estimation and I could 
not factor this into the estimation in this thesis due to time constraints. In order to test the 
validity that fiscal and monetary variables respond differently in an emerging economy due 
to the many reasons offered in this thesis, future estimations can include Russia, India and 
China other emerging economies albeit with a higher number of data observations. 
Furthermore, these results can then be compared to other approaches such as the sign 
restrictions, event study and the Blanchard Perotti.  
          In conclusion, expansionary fiscal policy is good but should be aimed at infrastructure 
projects, utility-generating economic activities and externalities that gets onto the economic 
production function. Alternatively, Brasilia can choose to support the private sector through 
government secured loan schemes or funding for lending schemes (as pertains to the UK) 
from the central bank so that the sector can expand production, employ more workers and 
generate extra revenue through income tax for the government which then can be used for 
more government purchases, assuming business leaders in Brazil do not see direct attempts 
from Brasilia to achieve full employment as undermining their political clout. Last but not 
least, emerging economies like Brazil should aim at strengthening their economic, financial 
and political institutions with particular emphasis on making these institutions transparent, 
communication/information savvy and inclusive for all and sundry. 
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 Appendix  
Data 
Variable                                  Description/Units                   Range                       Source 
Expend          Log of Government Expenditure +           1997Q1-2008Q4         IMF WEO 
                       Gross Investment Percent of GDP 
GDP               Log of Real Gross Domestic Product        1997Q1-2008Q4         IMF WEO 
                       in Constant Prices (Percent Change) 
INF                 Difference of Gross Domestic                    1997Q1-2008Q4         IMF WEO                        
                       Product Deflator  (Index)          
REV                Log of General Government Revenue     1997Q1-2008Q4         IMF WEO 
                       Percent of GDP        
INT                 Real Interest Rate                                       1997Q1-2008Q4          WB OD 
STOCKPIX      Log of Real Stock Price Index                    1997Q1-2008Q4      Yahoo Finance 
                       (BOVESPA)                                                                            
IMF WEO = International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook April 2013 
WB OD    =  World Bank Open Data Website 
 
 
Eviews Outputs 
 
Unit Root Tests For Stationarity for Expend 
 
Null Hypothesis: EXPEND has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.348639  0.5989 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPEND)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EXPEND(-1) -0.103433 0.076694 -1.348639 0.1845 
D(EXPEND(-1)) 0.060820 0.156492 0.388646 0.6995 
C 0.086206 0.063783 1.351556 0.1836 
     
     R-squared 0.040586    Mean dependent var 0.000190 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004038    S.D. dependent var 0.004169 
S.E. of regression 0.004177    Akaike info criterion -8.055352 
Sum squared resid 0.000750    Schwarz criterion -7.936093 
Log likelihood 188.2731    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.010677 
F-statistic 0.909513    Durbin-Watson stat 2.005760 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.410327    
     
      
First Difference of Expend 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(EXPEND) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPEND,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(EXPEND(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.005902 
S.E. of regression 0.004173    Akaike info criterion -8.098761 
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Sum squared resid 0.000784    Schwarz criterion -8.059008 
Log likelihood 187.2715    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.083870 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
      
Unit Root Tests for Stationarity of GDP 
 
Null Hypothesis: GDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.199881  0.2091 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:35   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GDP(-1) -0.206328 0.093790 -2.199881 0.0332 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.105075 0.152280 0.690012 0.4939 
C 0.030533 0.035515 0.859732 0.3947 
     
     R-squared 0.101161    Mean dependent var 0.002320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059354    S.D. dependent var 0.231586 
S.E. of regression 0.224608    Akaike info criterion -0.085925 
Sum squared resid 2.169300    Schwarz criterion 0.033334 
Log likelihood 4.976276    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.041250 
F-statistic 2.419738    Durbin-Watson stat 2.023692 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.100963    
     
      
First Difference of GDP 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GDP(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var -8.39E-18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.327529 
S.E. of regression 0.231598    Akaike info criterion -0.066128 
Sum squared resid 2.413693    Schwarz criterion -0.026375 
Log likelihood 2.520943    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.051236 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
      
Unit Root Test For Stationarity of INF 
 
Null Hypothesis: INF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.341040  0.9104 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:39   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF(-1) -0.006314 0.018514 -0.341040 0.7347 
D(INF(-1)) -0.277549 0.146678 -1.892235 0.0652 
C 0.014135 0.024301 0.581658 0.5638 
     
     R-squared 0.081965    Mean dependent var 0.004572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039266    S.D. dependent var 0.008707 
S.E. of regression 0.008534    Akaike info criterion -6.626526 
Sum squared resid 0.003132    Schwarz criterion -6.507267 
Log likelihood 155.4101    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.581851 
F-statistic 1.919595    Durbin-Watson stat 2.220086 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.159027    
     
      
First Difference of INF 
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Null Hypothesis: D(INF) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INF(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.013941 
S.E. of regression 0.009858    Akaike info criterion -6.379599 
Sum squared resid 0.004373    Schwarz criterion -6.339846 
Log likelihood 147.7308    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.364708 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
      
Unit Root Test For Stationarity of REV 
 
Null Hypothesis: REV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.827505  0.3629 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REV(-1) -0.180231 0.098621 -1.827505 0.0746 
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D(REV(-1)) 0.100972 0.158485 0.637108 0.5274 
C 0.159893 0.087235 1.832894 0.0737 
     
     R-squared 0.072127    Mean dependent var 0.000473 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028970    S.D. dependent var 0.005434 
S.E. of regression 0.005355    Akaike info criterion -7.558672 
Sum squared resid 0.001233    Schwarz criterion -7.439413 
Log likelihood 176.8495    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.513997 
F-statistic 1.671277    Durbin-Watson stat 2.017896 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.199987    
     
      
First Difference Test for REV 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(REV) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REV,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:44   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(REV(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.007715 
S.E. of regression 0.005455    Akaike info criterion -7.563053 
Sum squared resid 0.001339    Schwarz criterion -7.523299 
Log likelihood 174.9502    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.548161 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
      
Unit Root Test For Stationarity of INT 
 
Null Hypothesis: INT has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.983320  0.7516 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
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 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INT)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INT(-1) -0.044045 0.044792 -0.983320 0.3310 
D(INT(-1)) -0.014501 0.152492 -0.095096 0.9247 
C 0.039432 0.043626 0.903870 0.3711 
     
     R-squared 0.023358    Mean dependent var -0.003268 
Adjusted R-squared -0.022067    S.D. dependent var 0.017090 
S.E. of regression 0.017278    Akaike info criterion -5.215774 
Sum squared resid 0.012837    Schwarz criterion -5.096514 
Log likelihood 122.9628    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.171098 
F-statistic 0.514212    Durbin-Watson stat 2.003864 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.601602    
     
      
First Difference Test for INT 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INT) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INT,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INT(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.024617 
S.E. of regression 0.017407    Akaike info criterion -5.242400 
Sum squared resid 0.013635    Schwarz criterion -5.202647 
Log likelihood 121.5752    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.227509 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
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Unit Root Test For Stationarity for STOCKPIX 
 
Null Hypothesis: STOCKPIX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.584969  0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(STOCKPIX)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     STOCKPIX(-1) -0.948197 0.206806 -4.584969 0.0000 
D(STOCKPIX(-1)) 0.125896 0.157108 0.801336 0.4273 
C 0.035857 0.024944 1.437515 0.1578 
     
     R-squared 0.411475    Mean dependent var -0.013817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.384102    S.D. dependent var 0.190421 
S.E. of regression 0.149441    Akaike info criterion -0.900840 
Sum squared resid 0.960300    Schwarz criterion -0.781580 
Log likelihood 23.71931    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.856164 
F-statistic 15.03201    Durbin-Watson stat 1.866649 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000011    
     
      
Testing Whether Expend Gdp Inf Rev Int and Stockpix are Cointegrated 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPEND   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 18:25   
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 48   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.316731 0.306231 1.034289 0.3069 
GDP 0.000632 0.011862 0.053268 0.9578 
INF -0.153321 0.087401 -1.754225 0.0867 
REV 3.473637 0.347413 9.998582 0.0000 
INT 0.144011 0.121952 1.180877 0.2443 
STOCKPIX -0.021583 0.015289 -1.411655 0.1654 
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R-squared 0.811357    Mean dependent var 3.328508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788900    S.D. dependent var 0.034378 
S.E. of regression 0.015795    Akaike info criterion -5.341731 
Sum squared resid 0.010479    Schwarz criterion -5.107831 
Log likelihood 134.2015    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.253340 
F-statistic 36.12867    Durbin-Watson stat 0.503507 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Dependent Variable: D(E)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 18:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     E(-1) -0.310897 0.107960 -2.879733 0.0061 
D(E(-1)) 0.174596 0.148874 1.172782 0.2472 
     
     R-squared 0.158808    Mean dependent var -1.22E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.139690    S.D. dependent var 0.010827 
S.E. of regression 0.010043    Akaike info criterion -6.321417 
Sum squared resid 0.004438    Schwarz criterion -6.241911 
Log likelihood 147.3926    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.291634 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.046465    
     
      
 
Var Lag Order Selection 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: EXPEND GDP INF REV INT STOCKPIX    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 19:13     
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4     
Included observations: 43     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  481.2468 NA   1.01e-17 -22.10450 -21.85875 -22.01388 
1  672.1348  319.6265  7.66e-21 -29.30860 -27.58835 -28.67422 
2  685.2240  18.26390  2.46e-20 -28.24297 -25.04824 -27.06486 
3  719.3368  38.07944  3.53e-20 -28.15520 -23.48597 -26.43333 
4  974.0012  213.2074  2.48e-24 -38.32564 -32.18191 -36.06002 
5  1098.883   69.70177*   1.41e-25*  -42.45970*  -34.84148*  -39.65034* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Date: 07/16/13   Time: 20:23     
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2008Q4     
 Included observations: 43 after adjustments    
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 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1      
       
       EXPEND(-1)  1.000000      
       
GDP(-1)  0.098240      
  (0.00463)      
 [ 21.1982]      
       
INF(-1)  0.529094      
  (0.00646)      
 [ 81.9414]      
       
REV(-1) -5.046066      
  (0.06026)      
 [-83.7344]      
       
INT(-1)  1.064197      
  (0.02547)      
 [ 41.7850]      
       
STOCKPIX(-1)  0.006908      
  (0.00194)      
 [ 3.55768]      
       
C -0.597844      
       
       Error Correction: D(EXPEND) D(GDP) D(INF) D(REV) D(INT) D(STOCKPIX) 
       
       CointEq1 -4.435512  35.43492 -0.347351 -1.664455 -3.891037  68.79204 
  (1.91256)  (17.8243)  (0.59538)  (0.64637)  (2.61097)  (25.4224) 
 [-2.31915] [ 1.98801] [-0.58341] [-2.57507] [-1.49027] [ 2.70596] 
       
D(EXPEND(-1)) -1.766941  13.95924 -0.126707 -0.656399 -1.537052  26.11035 
  (0.76370)  (7.11736)  (0.23774)  (0.25810)  (1.04258)  (10.1513) 
 [-2.31367] [ 1.96130] [-0.53297] [-2.54320] [-1.47428] [ 2.57211] 
       
D(EXPEND(-2)) -1.411385  11.65635 -0.140233 -0.545152 -1.239571  24.48557 
  (0.74693)  (6.96109)  (0.23252)  (0.25243)  (1.01968)  (9.92845) 
 [-1.88958] [ 1.67450] [-0.60311] [-2.15959] [-1.21564] [ 2.46620] 
       
D(EXPEND(-3)) -1.722230  14.05340 -0.176882 -0.660583 -1.388969  18.67772 
  (0.72063)  (6.71602)  (0.22433)  (0.24355)  (0.98379)  (9.57891) 
 [-2.38988] [ 2.09252] [-0.78848] [-2.71235] [-1.41186] [ 1.94988] 
       
D(EXPEND(-4)) -0.475023  2.188811  0.041706 -0.303513 -0.946652  22.92363 
  (0.71338)  (6.64839)  (0.22207)  (0.24109)  (0.97388)  (9.48245) 
 [-0.66588] [ 0.32922] [ 0.18780] [-1.25890] [-0.97204] [ 2.41748] 
       
D(GDP(-1)) -0.016109  0.109230  0.001814 -0.004601 -0.020159  0.140435 
  (0.01633)  (0.15218)  (0.00508)  (0.00552)  (0.02229)  (0.21706) 
 [-0.98649] [ 0.71776] [ 0.35692] [-0.83375] [-0.90432] [ 0.64700] 
       
D(GDP(-2))  0.020914 -0.132498  0.001407  0.007417  0.007837  0.013926 
  (0.01590)  (0.14817)  (0.00495)  (0.00537)  (0.02170)  (0.21133) 
 [ 1.31549] [-0.89425] [ 0.28435] [ 1.38036] [ 0.36107] [ 0.06590] 
       
D(GDP(-3))  0.002020  0.021117 -0.002393 -0.000107  0.003991 -0.337507 
  (0.01620)  (0.15094)  (0.00504)  (0.00547)  (0.02211)  (0.21529) 
 [ 0.12473] [ 0.13990] [-0.47466] [-0.01958] [ 0.18050] [-1.56770] 
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D(GDP(-4))  0.022103 -0.657583  8.24E-05 -0.009905  0.015245 -0.280734 
  (0.01631)  (0.15204)  (0.00508)  (0.00551)  (0.02227)  (0.21685) 
 [ 1.35488] [-4.32513] [ 0.01623] [-1.79660] [ 0.68450] [-1.29461] 
       
D(INF(-1)) -12.92004  100.6864 -1.049292 -4.851561 -10.48107  201.1135 
  (5.49494)  (51.2107)  (1.71057)  (1.85708)  (7.50152)  (73.0406) 
 [-2.35126] [ 1.96612] [-0.61342] [-2.61247] [-1.39719] [ 2.75345] 
       
D(INF(-2)) -12.56572  98.02079 -0.992439 -4.714612 -10.38629  202.1718 
  (5.50884)  (51.3402)  (1.71490)  (1.86177)  (7.52049)  (73.2254) 
 [-2.28101] [ 1.90924] [-0.57872] [-2.53232] [-1.38107] [ 2.76095] 
       
D(INF(-3)) -12.28210  96.63087 -1.064416 -4.642208 -9.950809  201.9276 
  (5.44299)  (50.7266)  (1.69440)  (1.83952)  (7.43061)  (72.3502) 
 [-2.25650] [ 1.90494] [-0.62820] [-2.52360] [-1.33917] [ 2.79098] 
       
D(INF(-4)) -12.87575  100.9297 -0.120633 -4.764651 -10.74769  201.4900 
  (5.46736)  (50.9537)  (1.70199)  (1.84776)  (7.46387)  (72.6740) 
 [-2.35502] [ 1.98081] [-0.07088] [-2.57862] [-1.43996] [ 2.77252] 
       
D(REV(-1)) -9.072951  72.45275 -0.694760 -3.412348 -8.132153  156.0878 
  (4.14016)  (38.5846)  (1.28883)  (1.39921)  (5.65201)  (55.0324) 
 [-2.19145] [ 1.87776] [-0.53906] [-2.43876] [-1.43881] [ 2.83629] 
       
D(REV(-2)) -10.18094  79.88218 -0.802374 -3.804843 -8.447673  145.1672 
  (4.28822)  (39.9645)  (1.33492)  (1.44925)  (5.85415)  (57.0005) 
 [-2.37416] [ 1.99883] [-0.60106] [-2.62538] [-1.44302] [ 2.54677] 
       
D(REV(-3)) -9.585930  75.41648 -0.591916 -3.539369 -8.794579  166.3145 
  (4.14791)  (38.6569)  (1.29124)  (1.40183)  (5.66259)  (55.1354) 
 [-2.31103] [ 1.95092] [-0.45841] [-2.52482] [-1.55310] [ 3.01647] 
       
D(REV(-4)) -10.36428  95.69661 -0.906733 -4.238356 -8.493786  151.6024 
  (4.33315)  (40.3832)  (1.34891)  (1.46444)  (5.91548)  (57.5977) 
 [-2.39186] [ 2.36971] [-0.67220] [-2.89419] [-1.43586] [ 2.63209] 
       
D(INT(-1))  2.941492 -23.15961  0.240730  1.108564  2.459089 -46.34852 
  (1.27091)  (11.8443)  (0.39563)  (0.42952)  (1.73500)  (16.8933) 
 [ 2.31448] [-1.95533] [ 0.60847] [ 2.58095] [ 1.41734] [-2.74360] 
       
D(INT(-2))  3.094201 -24.11962  0.242363  1.157555  2.540728 -46.43778 
  (1.30646)  (12.1757)  (0.40670)  (0.44153)  (1.78354)  (17.3660) 
 [ 2.36838] [-1.98096] [ 0.59592] [ 2.62167] [ 1.42454] [-2.67407] 
       
D(INT(-3))  2.882430 -22.65507  0.223481  1.081270  2.450410 -46.06624 
  (1.29396)  (12.0592)  (0.40281)  (0.43731)  (1.76647)  (17.1998) 
 [ 2.22760] [-1.87865] [ 0.55481] [ 2.47256] [ 1.38718] [-2.67831] 
       
D(INT(-4))  2.269123 -24.99911  0.146678  0.847350  2.525814 -45.23071 
  (1.25622)  (11.7075)  (0.39106)  (0.42455)  (1.71496)  (16.6982) 
 [ 1.80631] [-2.13531] [ 0.37508] [ 1.99586] [ 1.47282] [-2.70873] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-1))  0.045183 -0.269791  0.002993  0.016695  0.022006 -1.640244 
  (0.03484)  (0.32466)  (0.01084)  (0.01177)  (0.04756)  (0.46305) 
 [ 1.29703] [-0.83100] [ 0.27595] [ 1.41809] [ 0.46273] [-3.54225] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-2))  0.090708 -0.545441  0.000752  0.030586  0.056687 -1.512402 
  (0.03957)  (0.36876)  (0.01232)  (0.01337)  (0.05402)  (0.52596) 
 [ 2.29243] [-1.47911] [ 0.06103] [ 2.28721] [ 1.04941] [-2.87551] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-3))  0.036122 -0.147874 -0.005311  0.010246  0.031920 -1.360380 
  (0.03512)  (0.32726)  (0.01093)  (0.01187)  (0.04794)  (0.46676) 
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 [ 1.02867] [-0.45186] [-0.48582] [ 0.86340] [ 0.66586] [-2.91451] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-4)) -0.003138  0.058584  0.002261 -0.000589 -0.021595 -0.314117 
  (0.02478)  (0.23091)  (0.00771)  (0.00837)  (0.03383)  (0.32935) 
 [-0.12663] [ 0.25370] [ 0.29312] [-0.07038] [-0.63842] [-0.95376] 
       
C  0.302695 -2.371244  0.025041  0.113965  0.247684 -4.856616 
  (0.13189)  (1.22920)  (0.04106)  (0.04458)  (0.18006)  (1.75318) 
 [ 2.29498] [-1.92909] [ 0.60989] [ 2.55668] [ 1.37558] [-2.77017] 
       
        R-squared  0.779522  0.807928  0.931075  0.786008  0.583622  0.702277 
 Adj. R-squared  0.455290  0.525469  0.829715  0.471313 -0.028700  0.264449 
 Sum sq. resids  0.002372  0.206054  0.000230  0.000271  0.004421  0.419170 
 S.E. equation  0.011813  0.110095  0.003677  0.003992  0.016127  0.157026 
 F-statistic  2.404208  2.860338  9.185792  2.497687  0.953130  1.604003 
 Log likelihood  149.7944  53.81318  199.9754  196.4418  136.4094  38.54526 
 Akaike AIC -5.757877 -1.293636 -8.091878 -7.927526 -5.135321 -0.583501 
 Schwarz SC -4.692966 -0.228725 -7.026966 -6.862614 -4.070409  0.481411 
 Mean dependent -0.000169  0.029045  0.004650  0.000313 -0.004567 -0.010506 
 S.D. dependent  0.016006  0.159821  0.008912  0.005491  0.015901  0.183090 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6.20E-27     
 Determinant resid covariance  2.37E-29     
 Log likelihood  1051.056     
 Akaike information criterion -41.35146     
 Schwarz criterion -34.71624     
       
        
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Date: 07/16/13   Time: 20:31     
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2008Q4     
 Included observations: 43 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1      
       
       EXPEND(-1)  1.000000      
       
GDP(-1)  0.093262      
  (0.00369)      
 [ 25.2906]      
       
INF(-1)  0.449706      
  (0.03094)      
 [ 14.5332]      
       
REV(-1) -5.101659      
  (0.05468)      
 [-93.2980]      
       
INT(-1)  1.023870      
  (0.02021)      
 [ 50.6531]      
       
STOCKPIX(-1)  0.006561      
  (0.00178)      
 [ 3.67750]      
       
@TREND(97Q1)  0.001161      
       
C -0.434386      
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       Error Correction: D(EXPEND) D(GDP) D(INF) D(REV) D(INT) D(STOCKPIX) 
       
       CointEq1 -5.236020  48.59354 -0.553447 -2.037872 -5.708162  93.65453 
  (2.35832)  (23.3604)  (0.74103)  (0.83635)  (3.38111)  (33.0020) 
 [-2.22023] [ 2.08017] [-0.74687] [-2.43663] [-1.68825] [ 2.83784] 
       
D(EXPEND(-1)) -2.101140  17.26710 -0.129150 -0.774962 -2.099448  32.22397 
  (0.84566)  (8.37665)  (0.26572)  (0.29990)  (1.21241)  (11.8340) 
 [-2.48463] [ 2.06134] [-0.48604] [-2.58407] [-1.73163] [ 2.72301] 
       
D(EXPEND(-2)) -1.761794  14.88839 -0.136321 -0.666375 -1.796751  30.45134 
  (0.82801)  (8.20182)  (0.26017)  (0.29364)  (1.18710)  (11.5870) 
 [-2.12776] [ 1.81525] [-0.52396] [-2.26935] [-1.51356] [ 2.62807] 
       
D(EXPEND(-3)) -2.072434  17.22279 -0.172079 -0.781225 -1.934064  24.53075 
  (0.80133)  (7.93757)  (0.25179)  (0.28418)  (1.14886)  (11.2137) 
 [-2.58625] [ 2.16978] [-0.68342] [-2.74905] [-1.68347] [ 2.18758] 
       
D(EXPEND(-4)) -0.807570  5.294325  0.043298 -0.419452 -1.475959  28.66421 
  (0.79008)  (7.82614)  (0.24826)  (0.28019)  (1.13273)  (11.0562) 
 [-1.02214] [ 0.67649] [ 0.17441] [-1.49702] [-1.30301] [ 2.59258] 
       
D(GDP(-1)) -0.031308  0.183743  0.003138 -0.009238 -0.032451  0.279892 
  (0.01741)  (0.17248)  (0.00547)  (0.00618)  (0.02496)  (0.24367) 
 [-1.79801] [ 1.06529] [ 0.57358] [-1.49603] [-1.29989] [ 1.14865] 
       
D(GDP(-2))  0.003015 -0.056528  0.003187  0.002073 -0.004568  0.156666 
  (0.01671)  (0.16556)  (0.00525)  (0.00593)  (0.02396)  (0.23389) 
 [ 0.18039] [-0.34144] [ 0.60684] [ 0.34966] [-0.19065] [ 0.66982] 
       
D(GDP(-3)) -0.017005  0.100829 -0.000652 -0.005840 -0.008264 -0.186566 
  (0.01631)  (0.16152)  (0.00512)  (0.00578)  (0.02338)  (0.22818) 
 [-1.04289] [ 0.62426] [-0.12726] [-1.00992] [-0.35350] [-0.81762] 
       
D(GDP(-4))  0.002729 -0.572131  0.001679 -0.015821  0.002437 -0.118591 
  (0.01635)  (0.16199)  (0.00514)  (0.00580)  (0.02345)  (0.22884) 
 [ 0.16687] [-3.53196] [ 0.32678] [-2.72804] [ 0.10394] [-0.51822] 
       
D(INF(-1)) -14.88002  134.6441 -1.578888 -5.780241 -15.26937  265.1115 
  (6.58366)  (65.2146)  (2.06870)  (2.33481)  (9.43894)  (92.1307) 
 [-2.26014] [ 2.06463] [-0.76323] [-2.47568] [-1.61770] [ 2.87756] 
       
D(INF(-2)) -14.44931  131.1185 -1.507113 -5.610588 -15.08247  264.5016 
  (6.55389)  (64.9196)  (2.05935)  (2.32425)  (9.39625)  (91.7141) 
 [-2.20469] [ 2.01970] [-0.73184] [-2.41394] [-1.60516] [ 2.88398] 
       
D(INF(-3)) -14.09761  128.8250 -1.564596 -5.508184 -14.53473  262.5294 
  (6.45092)  (63.8997)  (2.02699)  (2.28773)  (9.24863)  (90.2731) 
 [-2.18536] [ 2.01605] [-0.77188] [-2.40771] [-1.57156] [ 2.90817] 
       
D(INF(-4)) -14.60876  132.2036 -0.604653 -5.595312 -15.23454  260.3046 
  (6.42729)  (63.6656)  (2.01956)  (2.27935)  (9.21474)  (89.9424) 
 [-2.27293] [ 2.07653] [-0.29940] [-2.45478] [-1.65328] [ 2.89413] 
       
D(REV(-1)) -10.67888  101.4549 -1.198454 -4.202504 -12.05260  210.9871 
  (5.12991)  (50.8144)  (1.61191)  (1.81925)  (7.35471)  (71.7872) 
 [-2.08169] [ 1.99658] [-0.74350] [-2.31001] [-1.63876] [ 2.93906] 
       
D(REV(-2)) -11.66170  109.0164 -1.336427 -4.566206 -12.37378  200.3143 
  (5.27413)  (52.2430)  (1.65722)  (1.87040)  (7.56148)  (73.8053) 
 [-2.21111] [ 2.08672] [-0.80643] [-2.44130] [-1.63642] [ 2.71409] 
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D(REV(-3)) -11.12965  104.3183 -1.107742 -4.313628 -12.68800  221.0351 
  (5.13444)  (50.8593)  (1.61333)  (1.82086)  (7.36121)  (71.8506) 
 [-2.16764] [ 2.05112] [-0.68662] [-2.36901] [-1.72363] [ 3.07632] 
       
D(REV(-4)) -11.86828  124.7358 -1.428326 -5.002340 -12.43066  206.5387 
  (5.30733)  (52.5719)  (1.66766)  (1.88217)  (7.60908)  (74.2700) 
 [-2.23620] [ 2.37267] [-0.85649] [-2.65775] [-1.63366] [ 2.78092] 
       
D(INT(-1))  3.242619 -29.64347  0.349544  1.265137  3.400953 -58.51602 
  (1.45535)  (14.4160)  (0.45730)  (0.51612)  (2.08653)  (20.3660) 
 [ 2.22806] [-2.05629] [ 0.76437] [ 2.45124] [ 1.62996] [-2.87322] 
       
D(INT(-2))  3.357531 -30.49624  0.354905  1.302991  3.470258 -58.39416 
  (1.48281)  (14.6880)  (0.46593)  (0.52586)  (2.12590)  (20.7503) 
 [ 2.26430] [-2.07626] [ 0.76172] [ 2.47783] [ 1.63237] [-2.81414] 
       
D(INT(-3))  3.140037 -28.85506  0.331165  1.222542  3.360538 -57.68224 
  (1.46273)  (14.4891)  (0.45962)  (0.51874)  (2.09711)  (20.4693) 
 [ 2.14669] [-1.99150] [ 0.72052] [ 2.35676] [ 1.60246] [-2.81799] 
       
D(INT(-4))  2.525252 -31.02733  0.249985  0.986020  3.412104 -56.52372 
  (1.42032)  (14.0690)  (0.44629)  (0.50370)  (2.03631)  (19.8758) 
 [ 1.77794] [-2.20536] [ 0.56014] [ 1.95756] [ 1.67563] [-2.84385] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-1))  0.043675 -0.350158  0.004903  0.017153  0.035613 -1.787383 
  (0.03522)  (0.34885)  (0.01107)  (0.01249)  (0.05049)  (0.49283) 
 [ 1.24016] [-1.00376] [ 0.44308] [ 1.37338] [ 0.70533] [-3.62679] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-2))  0.084019 -0.614458  0.003417  0.029616  0.068396 -1.637894 
  (0.03920)  (0.38825)  (0.01232)  (0.01390)  (0.05619)  (0.54849) 
 [ 2.14360] [-1.58264] [ 0.27742] [ 2.13067] [ 1.21715] [-2.98618] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-3))  0.029137 -0.197115 -0.003128  0.008945  0.040895 -1.448652 
  (0.03429)  (0.33965)  (0.01077)  (0.01216)  (0.04916)  (0.47983) 
 [ 0.84975] [-0.58035] [-0.29032] [ 0.73557] [ 0.83189] [-3.01909] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-4)) -0.009004  0.033237  0.003913 -0.001797 -0.017393 -0.359826 
  (0.02402)  (0.23792)  (0.00755)  (0.00852)  (0.03444)  (0.33612) 
 [-0.37487] [ 0.13970] [ 0.51848] [-0.21098] [-0.50509] [-1.07052] 
       
C  0.233680 -2.201690  0.029187  0.092725  0.243670 -4.498403 
  (0.11082)  (1.09770)  (0.03482)  (0.03930)  (0.15888)  (1.55076) 
 [ 2.10870] [-2.00573] [ 0.83821] [ 2.35942] [ 1.53370] [-2.90078] 
       
@TREND(97Q1)  0.004305 -0.036298  0.000308  0.001610  0.004395 -0.069823 
  (0.00176)  (0.01745)  (0.00055)  (0.00062)  (0.00253)  (0.02466) 
 [ 2.44303] [-2.07964] [ 0.55702] [ 2.57724] [ 1.73988] [-2.83166] 
       
        R-squared  0.810817  0.813817  0.939744  0.797816  0.605957  0.716861 
 Adj. R-squared  0.503395  0.511270  0.841829  0.469267 -0.034362  0.256761 
 Sum sq. resids  0.002036  0.199736  0.000201  0.000256  0.004184  0.398636 
 S.E. equation  0.011280  0.111730  0.003544  0.004000  0.016171  0.157844 
 F-statistic  2.637472  2.689887  9.597522  2.428299  0.946336  1.558055 
 Log likelihood  153.0857  54.48273  202.8655  197.6621  137.5948  39.62513 
 Akaike AIC -5.864450 -1.278266 -8.179790 -7.937774 -5.143945 -0.587216 
 Schwarz SC -4.758580 -0.172397 -7.073921 -6.831905 -4.038075  0.518654 
 Mean dependent -0.000169  0.029045  0.004650  0.000313 -0.004567 -0.010506 
 S.D. dependent  0.016006  0.159821  0.008912  0.005491  0.015901  0.183090 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  5.68E-27     
 Determinant resid covariance  1.51E-29     
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 Log likelihood  1060.739     
 Akaike information criterion -41.52274     
 Schwarz criterion -34.64178     
       
        
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 07/22/13   Time: 19:52 
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4 
Included observations: 43 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  12.95622  0.9999 
2  26.79216  0.8674 
3  31.71051  0.6728 
4  132.9666  0.0000 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 36 df.  
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 07/22/13   Time: 20:21   
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 43   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.077990  0.043591 1  0.8346 
2  1.098125  8.642133 1  0.0033 
3  0.005016  0.000180 1  0.9893 
4 -1.459764  15.27154 1  0.0001 
5 -0.290463  0.604642 1  0.4368 
6  0.100612  0.072546 1  0.7877 
     
     Joint   24.63463 6  0.0004 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.537186  0.383770 1  0.5356 
2  9.714914  80.78638 1  0.0000 
3  4.196018  2.562904 1  0.1094 
4  14.64262  242.8616 1  0.0000 
5  4.478904  3.918658 1  0.0478 
6  2.648363  0.221537 1  0.6379 
     
     Joint   330.7349 6  0.0000 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.427361 2  0.8076  
2  89.42851 2  0.0000  
3  2.563084 2  0.2776  
4  258.1332 2  0.0000  
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5  4.523301 2  0.1042  
6  0.294082 2  0.8633  
     
     Joint  355.3695 12  0.0000  
     
          
 
 
